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ABSTRACT
We analyze the effects of protection using disaggregated data. This permits analysis of distinct effects of
tariffs and NTBs on trade. Our ~malysis indicates that tariffs tend to shift trade towards larger exporters. We find
signific~mt trade diversion caused by urriffs. In the case of NTBs, we fmd that quantitative barriers are more likely to
raise prices than ~rre price restrictions. Quantity barriers appear to lead exporters to concentrate on higher priced
varieties. We do not find much evidence to suggest that countries not t:"1fgeted by an NTB gain at the expense of
urrgeted countries. We find that NTBs tend to substitute for urriffs.
INTRODUCTION
This paper extends the literature] on the impact of protection by analyzing the impact of urriffs and non-wiff
barriers (NTBs) at a more disaggregated level than usual - 6-digit rather th~m 3 or 4-digit. The dat:'l are from the
UNCTAD TRAINS data base, which is an inventory of bilateral urriffs, NTBs, and trade flows for much of the world.
The extent of the dat:1 and level of disaggregation pennit a more detailed inquiry th~m is generally the case. The
literature is largely case studies of specific commodities ~md broader studies based on dat:'l aggregated to the 3 or 4-digit
industry levels. Case studies are cI~rr as to effects of NTBs, but they ~rre limited in scope so that it is hard to generalize
to questions regarding the overall level of world trade for various commodity classifications. The other studies address
issues reg~rrding the overall effects on trade, but they ~rre flawed by their reliance on highly aggregated rulUl. There ~rre
several adv~mulges to a &,aggregated approach. First, it allows for large samples so that we c~m consider regressions
for narrow commodity groups; this mitigates specification error due to structural differences in the detenninants of
trade flows across commodities. Second, a disaggregated approach enables us to obt:'lin improved estimates of both
the direct and diversionary impact of urriffs and NTBs on imports ~md to analyze more precisely the effectiveness of
wrrious types of NTBs in reducing imports and diverting trade. Finally, regressions on a large number of commodity
classifications allows for generalities not possible using case studies.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF BARRIERS
Simple theories of protection focus on m~rrkets with homogenous products and do not include provisions for
preferential urriffs or NTBs imposed on the same good imported from ditlerent countries. Predictions from these
theories ~rre well-known: the value and volwne of imports fall with the imposition of a t:"1fiff, while quantit:'ltive or
qualitative restrictions will lower the volume of imports but may raise or lower the value of imports depending on
domestic supply ~md demand elasticities.
The case of preferential or non-unifonn t:"1fiffs, where a country imposes different urriff rates for the smne
commodity against different trading partners, has been widely discussed. The general conclusion is that preferential
urriffs re:mlt in trade diversion from high to low urriff countries. In a frictionless model, there ~rre two effects in both
a monopolistic competition and a homogeneous goods world. In monopolistic competition, the aggregate increase in
price may result in a reduction of consumption within the industry, while the preferential nature of the trade barrier,
~md hence price changes, will reshuffle consumption across v~rrieties from high to low urriff varieties. We should
witness two influences on bilateral trade with ~my country: that due to the average level of urriffs, and that due to the
differential between its own urriff ~md the average of all other t:"1fiffs imposed on the smne good. When goods are
homogeneous, we also expect trade to become concentrated in low t:"1fiff countries. If trade is eliminated between the
importer and some exporters as a result of the trade barrier, then the concentration of trade in the low-tariff countries
may well increase the flow above the level one would predict based upon the established "norm." Generalizations of
these frameworks can lead to additional insights into the effects of trade barriers.
Consider, for exmnple, a unifonn tariff increase against all partners. Further, assume the reasonable
proposition that there are fixed costs in trading a good with any particular country. In a monopolistically competitive
model, country i exhibits ~m aggregate dem~md for variety in gex:x:ls and hence trades with all countries. A unifonn tariff
across pm'tner countries would result in a uniform contraction of trade, as consumers in i still demand the smne number
of vmieties of the good, but less of each. In other words, a uniform tariff would have the smne percentage impact on
imports from both small ~md large trading partners and will not result in trade diversion. Fixed costs in this case have
no impact. Suppose instead that trade is in homogeneous goods and involves fixed costs associated with trade. In order
to minimize these costs, we expect to see trade with as few countries as possible; variety here has no value. A unifonn
tariff increase in this case ~m have two effects on exports from countries with which the importing country still trades:
a trade reducing effect of the tariff on imports from j, ~md ~m offsetting trade diverting effect, where trade is diverted
from secondary to primary trading partners. In other words, a unifonn tariff will divert trade from small to large
exporters. Note the possibility that the value of trade rises for pairs of countries that continue to trade. Hence, we have
two different, model specific predictions in the case of unifonn tariffs when there is a fixed cost of trading: that of no
diversion in a model with monopolistically competitive trade, ~md diversion from small trading partners to large trading
partners in the case of homogenous goods.
In sum, the presence of fixed costs of trade and/or preferential tariffs and NTBs can generate seemingly
perverse results. Observed bilateral flows in the presence of a tariff may, on average, be larger than one might expect.
With preferential tariffs, consumption of low-tariff varieties in a model with differentiated goods will increase,
offsetting the reduction caused by the aggregate price increase, while in the homogenous goods framework, trade
becomes concentrated in low-tariff countries. Trade flows with large partners may also be, on average, larger than
expected in the homogeneous goods setting when we consider fixed costs of trading: the trade reducing effect of tariffs
on imports from a large trading partner is offset by trade diversion from a small to a large trading partner; this would
not occur in the absence of fixed costs because importers are indifferent between suppliers, or the number of suppliers.
NTBs, on the other h~md, have only an indirect effect on prices through import restrictions, unlike tariffs that raise
domestic prices directly. Hence, while the volume of imports declines as a result of an effective NTB, its effect on the
value of imports depends upon elasticities of domestic demand and supply. In other words, it is possible that an
effective NTB may lead to an increase in the value of imports.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICAnON
The TRAINS data is ~m inventory of bilateral tariffs, NTBs, and trade flows for much of the world. We limit
observations to 15 importers and 65 exporters; see Table 1 for countries.2 Data for each bilateral pair relates to a
specific year during the period 1988-1992. The barrier data is at the taritf line; generally the 8 or lO-digit Harmonized
Tariff System (HS) level. The trade data, however, is only present at the 6-digit HS level; thus we are limited to
observations at this !evel. For this study we obtain regression results for data grouped according to 2-digit SITC
groups; the groups chosen are in Table 2 along with the number of HS codes and observations for each 2-digit group.:I
That is, each set of regression results is based on all of the 6-digit HS codes that are in a particular 2-digit SITC group.
For example, one of our groups is footwe..1f. There are 25 6-digit HS codes that make up this group; thus the footwe~rr
regression covers these 25 HS codes for each of the 15 importers ~md 65 exporters. 4
The empiri~tl specification is a regression of the logarithm of bilatentl imports of good k imported by country
i from exporter j, on four sets of regressors: i) commodity dummy variables, ii) importer and exporter dummy wrriables,
iii) variables to capture urriff ~md non-t.1fiff barrier effects, ~md iv) additiomtl country pair effects.
TRADE RDW DATA: A trade flow observation from TRAINS, at the 6-digit HS level, is the dollar value of bilateral
imports for individual country pairs i ~md j. For m~my country combinations the trade flow is zero, thus we augment
the TRAINS flow data with zero flow observations for country pairs with no reported trade. Inclusion of the zero flow
•
observations avoids bias :md inconsistency induced when zero flow observations are omitted from the smnple. We do
not, however, include zero observations when the exporter does not export this good to any country, or the importer
does not import the good from any country. 5
COMMODITY DUMMY VARIABLES: Though we include only related commodities within each regression, there
may still remain some commodity specific effects. Hence we include commodity dummy variables to mitigate the
potential for bias and inconsistency that may arise from these systemic differences. There are separate dummy variables
for each 6-digit HS code in a regression smnple.
TABLE 1: IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS
IMPORTERS
Australia European Union Japan Norway Switzerland
Austria Fin1<md Korea, Rep. Of South Africa Taiwan
Canada Hong Kong New Zealand Sweden United States
EXPORTERS
Algeria Congo Indonesia Norway Sri L::mka
Australia Czech rep. Ire1<md Om::m Sweden
Austria Denmark Italy Pakist::m Switzerland
Bangladesh Ecuador Japan Pan::una Taiw::m
Belgium Egypt Kenya Paraguay Thai1<md
Bolivia Ethiopia Korea, Rep. Of Peru Trinidadffobago
Brazil Finland Malaysia Philippines Tunisia
Brunei Fnmce Mexico Poland Turkey
Bulgaria Gennany Morocco Portugal United Kingdom
Canada Greece Nepal Saudi Arabia United St::ltes
Chile Hong Kong Netherl::mds Singapore Uruguay
China Hungary New Zealand South Africa Venezuela
Colombia India Nigeria Spain Yugoslavia


















































































COUNTRY SPECIFIC DUMMY VARIABLES: The use of importer and exporter dummy variables eliminates
country-specific effects. Note that by including country dummies, we ::uso control for the effects of the sh::rre of
importer country i in total world spending as well as the output of industry k in exporter j. The sh::rre effect c1e::rrly
folds directly into the relevant importer dwnmy, while the output effect has both country and commodity components.
It should be noted that industry production in country j is not what we would optimally include in the regression;
ideally, we would include the determinants of industry production in country j.7 These determinants are country-
specific and, if their effects are assumed to be constant across the industries included in each regression, then they are
folded into the exporter dwnmy variables. The use of country dwnmies also avoids potential measurement errors that
may arise from alternative approaches such as the explicit use of factor endowments.
COUNTRY PAIR EFFECTS: The country pair effects (other than tariff and NTB effects) are a measure of the
distance between trading partners, Dij' a dwnmy variable indicating the existence of a common border, A;j' and a
dwnmy variable indicating that the countries share a common primary language, LANGij'
TRADE BARRIER DATA: Our protection variables are designed to pick up effects that other studies have not
explicitly addressed. The set of effects picked up by our tariff variables are industry substitution effects, varIety
substitution effects and trade compression effects, while NTBs result in direct effects, tariff-mitigating effects and
diversion effects. In what follows, we define these effects and the variables designed to capture their impact.
Our analysis requires data for tariffs and NTBs at the 6-digit HS level; however, such data are available at
the tariff line level. Each 6-digit HS code may comprise one or more tariff lines. We calculate the tariff for each 6-
digit HS category as the simple average across all tariff lines in that category. The TRAINS database manual lists 80
different NTBs. We divide these NTBs into four types on the basis of similarity in their administrative structure and
their primary effects. The NTB categories depend on whether they have direct price effects (PRICE), quantity
restrictions (QUANT), quality restrictions (QUAL), or involve a threat of retaliation (THREAT). The measure for
NTBs imposed against each 6-digit HS category is the proportion of tariff lines under each 6-digit HS code subject to
the NTB. For example, if there are four tariff lines associated with a particular 6-digit HS code, and country i imposes
a quantity restriction on imports from country j for three of the four tariff lines, then we record the value 0.75 for the
quantity NTB for importer i and exporter j. In a sample of product categories we found that a majority (more than
90%) ofNTBs are imposed against all tarifflines for a 6-digit HS category, hence one can loosely interpret measures
of NTBs as dwnmy variables for the presence or absence of an NTB.
An important difference between our data and the data used in more aggregated studies is that we avoid the
standard practice of trade weighting the protection data with own imports. Trade weighting induces simultaneous
equations bias since the dependent variable in the trade regressions (the value of trade) is used to form a regressor.
Since our data are highly disaggregated, and since the majority ofNTBs are imposed against all tariff lines for a 6-digit
HS category, trade weighting of NTBs is unnecessary. For tariff variables we calculate the average tariff (across
countries) for each 6-digit HS category, k, by weighting the tariff data by E~k' country j's exports of the 5-digit HS
category, k, that includes the 6-digit HS category, k. While aggregation issues still exist, they are substantially less
than is the case with more aggregated studies. The possibility of simultaneity is substantially reduced by use of 5-digit
aggregates since the left hand side (a 6-digit flow value) is generally a small portion of the 5-digit aggregate.
TARIFFS: There are three effects of tariffs that we investigate. Our framework incorporates a nested constant
elasticity of substitution utility function: there is a constant elasticity of substitution between a given product and all
other goods and a different elasticity between varieties of the same good. Within this framework, we can defme a price
index over varieties within an industry. Changes in this price index will lead consumers to substitute away from this
industry; this is our industry substitution effect. In the empirical specification, changes in this price index are
represented by -:ril<' a trade weighted average of'tij"k' the tariff between i and j for HS category k:
where~K is country j's exports of the 5-digit HS category, K, that includes the 6-digit HS category, k. As -:ril< rises,
ceteris paribus, so does the industry price index.
The second tariff effect, the variety substitution effect, is a diversion from one variety of the good to another.
We capture that effect with "Cijk --:tik_j,-:tik_j is simil,rr to -:tik except that exporter j is excluded from its calculation. This
v,rriable captures the differential between the tariff on country j's exports and the average t<rriff on competing wrrieties.
The effect is expected to be negative; high tariffs divert trade away from this exporter.
For several reasons we expect the number oftracting p,rrtners to decline when a t<rriff is imposed, be it unifonn
or preferential; this is the trade compression effect. In either case, it is hypothesized that a wriff concentrates a reduced
volume of trade among a smaller number of countries. Our prior is that trade with small exporters will cease and be
compressed into l<crger exporters. Our fmal tariff v,rriable is then EXj/-:tik. We expect higher tariffs to have a
disproportionately small impact on l,rrger exporters and hence ,mticipate a positive effect for this variable.
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS: Simil<crly, there ,rre three sep,rrate influences of non-t<rriff b,rrriers. The fIrst is the direct
effect. As discussed alxwe, ,m NTB c,m increase or decrease the value of trade, depending on elasticities. Hence, the
sign of the coefficients on the NTB v<rriables is dependent on smne elasticities. The t<rriff-mitigation effect arises from
the coincident application of a tariff ,md an NTB. The v,rriable capturing this effect is "Cijk*NTBijk; it is expected to have
,m effect opposite in sign from the effect on the NTB variable. We expect this effect because a tariff will already reduce
the level of trade ,md the NTB will have a smaller effect when applied to ,rrtiticially smaller trade. Finally, we check
the diversion effect; the extent to which the NTB diverts trade from exporters with the NTB to exporters not covered.
This is captured by NTB.j; a v<rriable that is positive and equal to the proportion of other exporters covered by the NTB
when exports from j <cre not covered by the NTB and is zero when country j exports ,rre covered by the NTB. It is
expected that trade will increase for countries not covered by the NTB.
ESTIMATING EQUATION: For each product category k, we estimate:
log(mijk ) =a+ q>(Ej) + A(MJ + w (HS) + q,(Dij) + Y(Aij) + 11 (LANGij) + olog( 1+ -:tik)
+ J.Ilog(l+"Cijk--:tik_j) + Klog(EXK/-:tik) + X1THREATijk + X2PRICEijk + x3QUANTijk
+ MQUAL;jk + Xll"Cijk *THREATijk + X21 "C;jk*PRICEijk+ X31"Cijk*QUANTijk
+Mltjjk.QUALijk+XI2THREATik_j+ X2?RICEik_j + X32QUANTik_j+ M2QUALik_j + Uijk·
Where mijk is the US dolI,rr value of the trade between two countries. The independent v,rriables include importer and
exporter-specific dununies (~, and 1;), a set of 6-digit HS commodity dummy v,rriables (HS), as well as v,rriables that
capture between-country effects: dist<mce, adjacency, ,md commonality of l,mguage. For each regression, we have as
Ill<myas 15 importers and 65 exporters as well as numerous 6-digit HS categories. However, not all exporters ,rre
represented in each regression. Ifa country does not export a corrunodity to any of the 15 importers, it is excluded from
the regression. In addition, missing t<rriff dat<l c,m reduce the number of countries.
METHOD OF ESTIMATION
As our dataset cont<tins a large number of zero values for the dependent v,rriable we use a standard Tobit
estimator. The existence of simulumeous equation bias has been widely discussed. For the following reasons, we <cre
not concerned about this as in the present setting. In our regression, the potential for simult<meity <crises from two
sources. First, there is the endogenous protection ,rrgument that, while protection is directed at reducing imports, high
levels of imports are a cause of protection. Note, however, that barriers ,rre imposed prior (often, ye,rrs prior) to the
obserwtions on flows. A past trade flow may be the cause of a b,rrrier, but current flows cannot cause the imposition
ofa Ixrrrier in the past. Second, we use ~K' country j's exports of·the 5-digit HS category, K, that includes the 6-digit
HS category, k, to weight our taritf v,rriables. In our case, this source of bias ,md inconsistency is quite small because
of the level of disaggregation. EXj< is country j's exports of the 5-digit HS category, K, that includes the 6-digit HS
category, k; hence, each trade flow observation at the 6-digit HS code, k, on the left h,md side of the regression is only
a small p,rrt of EXj< on the right hand side of the regression.
Prior studies have encountered ,mother potential source of simult<meity: the use of trade weighted measures
oflxtrriers to trade in order to aggregate to 3- or 4-digit SIC level. Trade weights are used to aggregate b,rrriers because
b,rrriers are typically imposed against only a fraction of the commodities in each 3- or 4-digit aggregation. Trade
weighted measures clearly introouce bias since the left-h.md-side variable (trade flow) is also found on the right-hLmd-
side of the regression. We do not use trade weighted measures to aggregate from the tariff lines to the 6-digit HS codes,
because the barriers are typica.IIy imposed against all tariff lines in a 6-digit HS catagory.8
There is a potential source of error that may be present in disaggregated studies that may not be present in
more aggregated data. If an NTB is non-binding (for exmnple, a quota where actual trade is less than the quota),
measurement error in the NTB variable is present. While the effect of measurement error in a regressor is statistically
identical to the effect of simultaneous equations error, the remedy is not the smne; that is, instrumental variables
estimation is not possible in this setting. With highly aggregated data, one is less likely to find a non-binding
restriction across all commodities in a three or four digit industry category. Of course, the aggregation error when
using three or four digit data may be substantia.IIy greater than the error from non-binding barriers.
ISSUES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Before we discuss regression results, it is useful to outline a general frmnework for interpreting the results.
Let us consider a pair of countries, i, .md j. When, ceteris paribus, trade between i and j is "large" or "out-of-line" in
comparison with trade in that gocx:i for other exporters, we say that trade is "large" between i and j. On the other hand,
if trade is sma.II in comparison with other countries, we say that trade is "small." Finally, if the level of trade is similar,
we will say that trade is "normal."
Importers choose to impose b<UTiers for a number of reasons. Trade need not necessarily be large for a trade
bLUTier to be imposed. A bLUTier can be imposed against all exporters when trade is nonnal for all exporters; for
instance, to protect a declining industry. It is also possible that a bLUTier could be selectively imposed against j when
trade is small. This case is unlikely as it implies that a barrier is imposed against countries with whom trade is small,
but not against exporters for whom trade is large or nonnal. However, we carmot rule out this case since barriers are
often imposed for political reasons, such as barriers imposed against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait. However,
it seems reasonable to state that it is least common for barriers to be imposed when trade is small.
Interpretation of the sign of coefficients on bLUTiers to trade is not as straightforward as implied by some
discussions in the literature on the effects of barriers. Researchers have generally expected significLmt, negative or
insignific,illt effects. Positive, signific,mt results often are considered to imply errors in the econometric methods
employed, in model specification, or in measures of the b'UTiers. However, if a barrier is imposed against a country
.illd good for which trade is large, then a positive .md signific.mt barrier coefficient me.ms that the barrier was not
effective, or thal it had an effect in lowering trade but it did not lower trade below or commensurate with that of other
countries. Regression coefficients measure partial correlations: a positive coefficient on a b'UTier only implies positive
partial correlations between trade .md the b'UTier to trade.
Note that.m insignific,mt coefficient does not necessarily imply an ineffective barrier. It Gm me.m that the
barrier was imposed against a good .md country where trade was large and the b'UTier was effective in bringing trade
back to a normal level. A negative, significant coefficient would appear to unmnbiguously imply an effective barrier.
However, this is not necessarily the case. If the b'UTier is imposed against a country with sma.II trade, then the
coefficient could be negative .md signific,mt even if the barrier has no effect on trade. In what follows, we illustrate,
for our particular set of variables, just what particular coefficient values might or might not me'ill .
.£~~:
The following table gives possible outcomes for coefficients on our average tariff measure,-'til<' ,md our trade
diversion variable, 't ijk- - 'til<_j. Column headings refer to the trade level descriptions given above. Row headings refer
to whether the tariff mea~llfe does or does not effect trade. Note, ,. - "me.ills negative .md signitic'illt .md " + " me.ms









A few conclusions can be reached from an examination of the tariff measures. First, a positive, significant coefficient
implies that the barrier has been imposed where trade is large, regardless of whether the barrier is effective. Second,
an insignificant coefficient implies that a barrier was not imposed in a situation where trade was small; again,
regardless of whether it is effective. Finally, if we are willing to rule out the possibility that, as a general rule, barriers
are imposed where trade is small, or that such a case is rare (a reasonable position), then a negative, significant
coefficient implies ~m effective barrier.
The coefficients on the NTB variables are subject to similar, though more complicated interpretations. The
complication arises because ~m effective barrier may well yield an increased value of trade. Begirming with the raw
NTB variable, the indicator of whether or not a given country is subject to the NTB, we find the following sets of
relationships to be plausible. Again, interpret the column headings as describing the level of unprotected trade between











First, if we rule out cases where b~UTiers are imposed against small trade countries, then a negative coefficient tells us
that the barrier was effective. Second, a positive, significant coefficient where trade is large may imply that the NTB
is ineffective or that it did not lower trade commensurate with that of other countries. In the case where trade is
normal, a positive, signific~mt coefficient implies that an effective NTB may have increased the value of trade
Considering our NTB diversion variables, let the colwrms of the following table describe unprotected trade











We can make the following statements. A negative, signific~mt coefficient implies that the b~UTier (effective or not
effective) is imposed against j and trade between i and m is small. A negative, significant coefficient means little, if
any, diversion to m when a tariff is imposed against j. Second, an insignificant coefficient implies that the barrier is
not imposed in cases where trade between i and m is large. Finally, if we are willing to rule out the possibility that
trade between i and m is large (a reasonable position, since, otherwise, it would imply that a b~UTier was imposed
against j but not m, even though trade with m was large), then a positive, signific~mt coefficient implies that ~m
effective b~UTier has been imposed against j and that trade diverts to other trading partners, m.
RESULTS
Columns 2-4 of Table 3 present coefficients for -:til<, the weighted average tariff of country i, 'tjjk--:til<.j, the
deviation of country j's tariff from the average tariff imposed against other importers, ~md -:til< crossed with j's exports
of the good.Q -:til< is a proxy for the aggregate price effect of tariffs imposed on HS category k. While one expects that
a higher -:til< should result in substitution of purchases away from this good (~md hence a negative coefficient), we know
from the previous section that positive coefficients are plausible; they indicate the tariffs for this product category tend
to be higher for goods in which trade is large, but the imposition does not bring trade down to a nonnal level. Of the
nine significant coefficients for -:til< given in Table 3, five are negative. While this suggest mixed results, a closer
inspection reveals ~m interesting perspective. All of the positive, significant coefficients ~rre for categories that ~rre
natural resource intensive (dairy products, textile fibers, metalliferous ores, petroleum) while all of the negative,
signific~mt coefficients are in labor-intensive, capital-intensive, or chemical industries (plastic materials, non-electrical
maChinery, tr~msport equipment, furniture, footwear). Unless it is the case that tariffs are higher for commodities in
which trade is small (an unlikely case), we can say that, for the latter industries, high tariffs reduce trade. For natural
resource intensive industries, the results indicate that high urriffs ~rre imposed where trade is hrrge; though we c~mnot
be certain as to whether the higher tariffs are effective in reducing trade.
'iik -~.j is designed to reve<u the extent to which preferenti,u tmiffs result in trade diversion. We expect trade
to be diverted away from countries with the highest tluiffs (,md hence a negative coefficient); however, from our earlier
discussion we know that positive coefficients are plausible. Nonetheless, we find the strong result that ten of the
reported industries have negative, significMt coefficients, while only one coefficient is positive and significant. Again,
according to the frmnework above, unless one believes that the highest tariffs are systematic,uly imposed against the
smallest exporters, a negative, coetlicient is sufficient to infer trade diversion. Nine of the ten negative coefficients
f<ul within a reasonable range (-3.1 ,md -17.9) implying that a bilateral tariff 1% above other tariffs will result in a
three to 18 percent decline in bilateral trade. The remaining negative coefficient ( for the cmu, coke ,illd briquette
sector) is over 100, reflecting a high degree of substitutability across suppliers.
TABLE 3: TARIFF AND NTB REGRESSIONS RESULTS
SITC , 'i -, EX*, Price Qmilltity Quality
2 58.997* 0.765 1.481** -0.71 3.944* -2.048**
6 -16.091 5.769* 1.445** 0.954 1.701 * 3.429**
24 5.82 -5.323 1.094** -0.250 0.069 0.996**
26 27.569** -17.883** 1.516** -1.026 -4.166** -0.529*
28 164.656** -6.383 1.348** 0.875 -36.406 -0.616
32 -63.42 -112.445** 1.236** -5.088** 2.936*
33 19.944** -4.923 1.588** 2.264** -1.157 - I .519**
58 -6.153** -4.743** 1.302** 1.256* 3.223** -0.491 **
61 -3.920 -4.972** 1.358** -1.435* 0.642 1.016**
62 -3.426 -6.378** 1.351 ** 0.152 -0.632 -0.518*
64 -0.029 -13.103** 1.343** -0.082 4.281 * -0.069
71 -18.59** -5.413** 1.107** -0.937** -1.906 0.334
73 -12.739** -3.934** 1.288** 0.908 -2.543 0.298
82 -6.041 ** -8.096** 1.266** -3.123** -0.6 1.176**
85 -8.606** -3.137** 1.274** 0.464 -0.857** 0.68







Our fmal tariff variable, EXj <*""i"ik' yields consistent, strong results. Every coefficient is positive, signific,illt
and between 1.09 and 1.60. This implies that trade compression is present in every industry; according to our
reasoning above, this :,uggest'> that variety, to the extent that it is import<illt, is secondary to the desire to minimize the
fixed costs associated with e<lch bilateral now. Regardless of the impact of fixed costs, this result further implies that
sImul exporters bear the brunt of high industry t<rritls.
The results tar the t,rriff bmTiers are quite striking. We find strong evidence of diversiomrry tendencies, and
strong evidence that countries wish to minimize the number of their trading p,rrtners. Finally, we find that higher
t<rriffs ,rre associated with low trade in a number of non-resource intensive sectors, while higher t<rriffs ,rre associated
with high trade in a number of resource intensive sectors.
Columns 5-8 of Table 3 presents coefficient'> for the NTB me<L'iUfes. These coefficients exhibit less unifonnity
th,m do the t<rriff coefficient'>. Nevertheless. telling patterns do 'rrise. Among the signific,illt coefficients for the price
,illd qu,mtity NTBs, a we<tk, but suggestive, correlation is found. There ,rre six signific,illt coefficients in each column,
with four negative price ,md four positive qUMtity coefficients. Our reading is that quantity restrictions ,rre more likely
to raise price <md hence the value of trade th<m ,rre price restrictions. This relationship strikes us as very plausible.
As we will see, the diversion coefficients lend addition,u credibility to the above assertion. As most goods are available
in a wide r<mge of varieties ,md qmuities, when faced with a limit on the qU<mtity that C,ill be sold, a profit maximizing
strategy would be to concentrate on the higher priced varieties. 1O This practice need not lead to a higher value of




significant quality coefficients, five are positive and five are negative. Threat NTBs are not common in our data and.
hence, we are unable to generate coefficients with much precision.
We also generate coefficients designed to test for diversion resulting from the various NTBs. These are
presented in columns 2-5 of Table 4. Our prior regarding the diversionary effects of NTBs is that they restrict the
competitiveness of goods from the target country, benefiting those not targeted by the NTB; this implies a positive
diversion coefficient. Recall from our earlier discussion, however, that a negative, significant coefficient is plausible;
it simply signifies that countries against whom NTBs are not imposed tend to be partners with whom trade is small.
Only three of the ten significant coefficients are positive; two are on quality and one on quantity NTBs. This is in
contrast to the t..uiff diversion me.:1SUfe, 'tijk-:tik•i , which clearly shows tariff diversion effects. The negative, significant
NTB diversion coefficients are not infonnative with regard to diversion. Not surprisingly, the negative, significant
coefficients imply that NTBs tend not to be imposed against trading partners with whom trade is small. Note that we
can correlate re1>'Ults in this table with the apparent quality upgrading in the previous table. If quality upgrading is what
qmmtity constrained suppliers are doing, then unconstrained suppliers are increasingly pushed into lower quality, lower
priced markets. This seems entirely consistent with a lower value of trade. Indeed. all but two of the ten (and three
of the four signific~mt) coefficients on the qmmtity diversion variable, are negative.
TABLE 4: NTB DIVERSION AND CROSSPRODUCT REGRESSION RESULTS
Diversion Crossproduct
SITC Price Qmmtity Quality Threat Price Quantity Quality Threat
02 -4.683 50.186** -37.546** -6.382
06 12.082 -8.676* -24.802* -14.563**
24 16.474 -157.582* -0.191
26 -1.505 -10.625** -2.934 -19.494 2.678 20.851 **
28 -116.093** 14.801 *
32 -52.008
33 -16.844 1260** -3.880
58 6.454 2.259 1.319 -19.650** 1.174 -10.585 7.446** -3.667
61 -26.922* -2.834 -61.844* -10.404 -11.682** 0.589 3.031
62 4.837 -5.716 1.645 7.815** 19.689 0.871 97.095
64 4.863 -1.515 33.419** 16.797** -21.500 8.234**
71 -5.634 -9.234** 2.532 18.753** 10.599 -5.220
73 20.313 15.597** -9.749 -10.558* 55.736 2.511
82 -5.173** 6.141 ** 20.266 -8.476**
85 9.449 -0.587 1.037 6.436** 8.895** -16.012** 1.012
**, * Significantly different from zero at the 5 ,md 10% level, respectively.
Our final result pertains to the ability of NTBs to substitute for tariffs. Many countries are believed to have
erected nontariff b,UTiers to trade in response to negotiated reductions in tariff barriers, but there is little evidence of
the effectiveness of this strategy. Columns 6-9 of Table 4 enables a crude test of the ability of NTBs to substitute for
tariffs. If tariffs ,md NTBs do substitute for one ~mother, we ought to tind the impact of NTBs being offset by the
presence of a tariff. That is, if we cross the tariff variable with each of the four NTB variables, we ought to obtain
coefficients that are opposite in sign to the simple NTB coefficients. Comparing the coefficients in Table 4 with those
in Table 3, we find that of the 44 coefficients, 34 of them are of opposite sign. Of the significant coefficients, 17 of
the 20 are of the predicted sign. This suggests that NTBs tend to be substitutes for tariffs.
CONCLUSION
Our study differs from prior work in that our unit of observation is at the 6-digit HS level. This wealth of
infonnation allows us to control for the importing and exporting country as well as the commodity and, unlike prior
studies, we consider three separate effects for each of tariffs and NTBs. For tariffs there are the industry substitution
effects, variety substitution effects and trade compression effects, while NTBs result in direct effects, tariff-mitigating
effects and diversion effects. While interpretation of signs of coefficients is problematic, we are nonetheless able to
make a number of observations. Our ~malysis indicates a concentrating influence of higher tariffs; that is, tariffs tend
to shift trade flows toward'5 the largest exporters. We also find significmlt trade diversion caused by tariffs; that is, trade
is diverted away from countries with the highest tariffs. Our results suggest a possible difference in the effects of
general tariff levels on trade in natural resource intensive commodities versus non-resource intensive commodities.
In the case of NTBs, we find that quantitative barriers are more likely to raise prices th~m are price restrictions.
Quantity barriers also appear to lead exporters to concentrate on higher priced varieties. We do not find much evidence
to suggest that countries not targeted by ~m NTB gain at the expense of targeted countries. We find that NTBs tend
to substitute for tariffs.
By concentrating on observations at the 6-digit HS level we ~ue able not only to control for a wuiety of teuiff
~md NTB effects, but we ~ue able to show substemtial diversity of results across industries. With the exception of the
coefficient on~<*~, the values and significance levels of the coefficients often differ substemtially by industry. For
the sake of comp~uison, we two additional regressions. The rust uses a random smnple from each of the 15 SITe 2-
digit industries used in this study. The coefficient of EXj <*"i"ik mirrored our earlier results. The coefficient of"i"ik is
negative ~md signifiamt whereas it is positive ,md significmn in 4 of the industry regressions. The coefficient of 't ijk- "i"ik.j
is insignifiamt; realll that these coefficients cue negative and significant in 10 of the 15 industry regressions. Of the
coefficients on the direct NTB effects, only the coefficient of QUAL is signifiamt. In addition to pooling the data for
a single regression, we ,lisa aggregated the datet to the 3-digit level to mirror more closely the type of ~malysis
conducted by previous rese,uchers. Again, a single regression over all industries cmmot suggest a diversity of effects
across industries. Among the direct terriff ,md NTB effects, only the coefficient of QUAL is signific,mt. This contrasts





(a) We express appreciation to Simon Evenett and Marie Thursby for comments on an earlier draft. Financial support
was provided, in part, by the Purdue University Center for International Business Education and Research.
1 See, for exmnple, Harrigan (1993), Trefler (1993), ~md Lemner (1988,1990).
2 The data includes infonnationon only 30 importers. We ~malyze only importers that are developed.
3 Two-digit industries can include a large number of 6-digit HS commodities. Our selection of industries was made,
in part, to avoid ~m urummageable nwnber of regressors while, at the smne time, allowing for a diverse set of industries.
4 An important difference of our study from the existing literature is in the use of 3 or 4-digit aggregates in other
studies; that is, unlike this study, for which the unit of observation is observed trade at the 6-digit level, the existing
literature uses units of observation that ~rre the aggregate trade observed at the 3 or 4-digit category (generally, these
are SITC categories). In order to obtain sufficient smnple sizes for the trade flow regressions when using such
aggregates, it is neces~rry to combine in a single regression the observations from nwnerous product categories. Hence,
one might find observations on the trade flow in chemicals combined in a regression with observations relating to
footwear. Unfortunately, the broader the product categories used in a given regression, the greater the potential
specification error due to structural differences. For exmnple, if the efficacy of a barrier v~rries across types of products
(for exmnple, if the effect varies depending on the level of labor intensity), then the mrrrower the product categories
used in a regression, the less the systematic error in the regression. While our regressions ~rre considered for narrower
product categories than other studies, systemic differences in trade flows associated with each 6-digit product category
may remain; however, they are reduced compared to the potential error from studies using 3 or 4-digit aggregates.
5 We recognize that this may induce error into our regressions if the failure to export or import is due to barriers. It
may also be due to a small (or zero) scale of production or to a small (or zero) level of consumption of the good.
Inclusion ofzero observations in this latter case c~m also lead to error.
(> "Industry Type" is from Lemner (1990), Table 13.3.
7 These detenninants would be endowments of productive resources in a traditional Heckscher-Ohlin frmnework, ~md
country output in a simple monopolistically competitive fnunework.
8 In a sample we studied, we tound that more than 90% of the non-trade b~rrriers are imposed against all of the products
in a tariff line.
Q All R2 are in the mrrrow range 0.211 to 0.264.
10 See Feenstra(1988) on this phenomenon in the e~rrly 1980s during the Jap~mese automobile VERs.
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